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I.

INTRODUCTION

Debt recharacterization occurs when a court reclassifies a
claimant’s debt claim as an equity interest.1 That ostensibly nominal
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1
In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001).
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classification is rendered significant because of the Bankruptcy Code’s
priority scheme, which calls for the repayment of debt claims before
equity interests.2 In an asset distribution, a debt claim that has been
recharacterized as an equity interest necessarily loses its priority status,
thereby reducing the likelihood of it being repaid.3
Until recently, the circuits generally agreed that bankruptcy courts’
recharacterization authority stemmed from the equitable authority grant
in § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.4 The Fifth Circuit ended that
consensus when it shoehorned § 502 into the debt recharacterization
analysis.5 Directing bankruptcy courts to categorize a claim or interest
before allowing it to proceed under § 502,6 the Fifth Circuit found that an
equity interest held by a non-insider did not constitute a claim and, as a
result, could not proceed under § 502.7 In essence, the Fifth Circuit’s
decision meant that a court’s categorization of a claim or interest became
dispositive.8
In transposing the equitable authority to recharacterize a debt claim
from § 105 to § 502, the Fifth Circuit has molded an approach that will
likely produce overwhelmingly negative ramifications for businesses.9
Its adoption by other courts will lead to the unfair penalization of noninsiders whose funds are often necessary to keep flailing businesses
afloat.10 Additionally, the Lothian approach would force bankruptcy
courts to deal with complex issues at the front end of the case, thereby
denying claimants the right to proceed with their claims.11
This article evaluates the two approaches for determining the
appropriate instance in which to consider debt recharacterization and
ultimately rejects the approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit. Part I
introduces the concept of debt recharacterization and its significance.
Part II analyzes the disparate approaches that courts have developed.
Part III examines the Lothian approach and the implications of its

2

11 U.S.C. § 726.
In re AutoStyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at 749.
4
See, e.g., id.; In re Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for Dornier Aviation
(N. Am.), Inc., 453 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter In re Dornier Aviation, Inc.]; In
re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2006).
5
See In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 539 (5th Cir. 2011).
6
Id.
7
In re Lothian Oil, 650 F.3d at 543.
8
See infra Part II.B.
9
James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization Under State
Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257, 1278 (2007).
10
See infra Part III.B.
11
See infra Part III.B.
3
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adoption. The article concludes with a recommendation against adoption
of the Fifth Circuit’s approach to debt recharacterization.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE SOURCE OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS’ DEBT
RECHARACTERIZATION ANALYSIS
A. The Traditional Approach: Authority to Recharacterize Grounded in
§ 105(a)
The majority of circuits that have addressed the question cite
§ 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) as the source of
bankruptcy courts’ recharacterization authority.12 The most compelling
reason for embracing § 105(a) is found in In re Dornier Aviation (North
America), Inc., a Fourth Circuit decision issued in 2006.13 The language
of § 105(a) clearly states that a bankruptcy court has the equitable
authority to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”14 The Fourth Circuit
understood § 105(a) to be a broad provision that vested bankruptcy
courts with far-reaching powers.15 The expansiveness of § 105(a) is
evidenced by its minimal requirements for the type of judgments it
allows. That is to say, under § 105(a), a judgment need only be
appropriate—not necessary—for furthering the objectives of the Code.
Congress intended for § 105(a) to give bankruptcy courts the
equitable authority necessary to issue judgments aimed at implementing
the priority scheme set forth in § 726.16 In fact, the Fourth Circuit noted
that “implementation of the Code’s priority scheme requires a
determination of whether a particular obligation is debt or equity.
Where, as here, the question is in dispute, the bankruptcy court must
have the authority to make this determination in order to preserve the
Code’s priority scheme.”17 The Fourth Circuit reemphasized the
importance of upholding the Code’s intentions when it asserted: “In light
of the broad language of § 105(a) and the larger purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code, we believe that a bankruptcy court’s power to
12

See, e.g., In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 744 (6th Cir. 2001); In re
Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2006); In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432
F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2006).
13
In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 231.
14
Id. (emphasis added).
15
See id. (“In our view, recharacterization is well within the broad powers afforded a
bankruptcy court in § 105(a) and facilitates the application of the priority scheme laid out
in § 726.”).
16
Id.
17
Id.
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recharacterize is essential to the proper and consistent application of the
Code.”18
To buttress its grounding such authority in § 105(a), the Fourth
Circuit touched on the insufficiency of § 502(b) for achieving that
purpose. Significantly, the Fourth Circuit did not explicitly denounce
§ 502(b) as the basis for recharacterization.19 Instead, the court
concluded that an analysis under § 502(b) was only the first of a two-step
process.20
Thereafter, a court must address the issue of
recharacterization, whose analysis occurs under § 105(a). The Fourth
Circuit held, “[e]ven if a claimant is able to meet § 502’s minimal
threshold for allowance of the claim, the bankruptcy court still must look
beyond the form of the transaction to determine the claim’s proper
priority.”21 The Fourth Circuit concluded that bankruptcy courts should
not
consider
recharacterization
under
§ 502(b),
because
recharacterization does not determine a claim’s allowance.22 Instead,
bankruptcy courts should postpone the recharacterization analysis until it
becomes necessary for establishing a priority scheme for claims.23
According to the Fourth Circuit’s articulate analysis, bankruptcy courts
cannot examine recharacterization under § 502(b) without accounting for
§ 105(a).24
B. Transition to Lothian (Equity Is Not a Claim Under § 502)
Indubitably, the Dornier court offered impelling reasons for the
need to go beyond § 502(b) in determining recharacterization.
Nevertheless, other courts have made compelling arguments for ending
the inquiry at § 502(b) by expounding upon the definition of “claim” as it
pertains to that provision.25 By assuming a limited definition of the word
“claim,” some courts have determined that, because equity interests are
not claims, they cannot pass the threshold requirements for allowability
under § 502(b).26 The putative claim’s inability to survive § 502(b)
18

Id. at 231.
See generally In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 231.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 232.
22
Id.
23
Id. Bankruptcy courts determine the priority scheme pursuant to § 726; however,
§ 726 does not provide for recharacterization of claims. Instead, the courts derive their
authority to recharacterize from § 105(a), the equitable authority provision. See id.
24
Id. at 232.
25
In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. 124, 138 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1999).
26
Id. (citing Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle Street
Partnership, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) (applying the term “interest” as contained in 11 U.S.C.
19
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necessarily obviates any need for analysis under § 105(a).27 According
to that line of thought, the definition of “claim” includes debt claims but
excludes equity interests.28 One court explained:
Although 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) and 101(12) define “claim” as a
right to payment and “debt” as liability on a claim, these
definitions obviously do not include a right to payment based on
an equity security or other interest in the debtor arising from
capital contributions. That the interest in the debtor gives rise to
a right to payment does not make that interest a claim.29

The court provided only a vague explanation of how it reached the
conclusion that the definition of “claim” obviously excludes equity
interests.30 The court opined that the Code intended to exclude equity
holders from bringing claims for the repayment of debt in bankruptcy.31
The court made that assumption based upon a provision in § 1129(a)(10)
which states that confirmation of a repayment plan requires acceptance
by one or more classes of claims.32 The court then asserted, “acceptance
by a class of interests does not suffice.”33 The court failed to
acknowledge, however, the possibility that those two concepts are not, in
fact, mutually exclusive.
The Sixth Circuit has entertained the idea of disallowing so-called
claims for equity interest under § 502(b) more than once.34 In an
unpublished decision, the Sixth Circuit opined, “a claim seeking to
recharacterize debt to equity is the same as objecting to the claim’s
‘allowance.’”35 The court reached that conclusion after deciding that a
recharacterization from debt to equity nullifies a claim.36 The court
explained that “[a] debtor’s request to recharacterize a claim is a request
for the bankruptcy court to hold a debt, and hence any claim, is non§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“retain under the plan on account of such . . . interest any
property”))); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
27
See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2001).
28
In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. at 138.
29
Id. at 139 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12) (1994)).
30
See id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 124 n.25.
33
Id.
34
See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2001); see
generally In re Russell Cave Co., 107 F. App’x 449 (6th Cir. 2004).
35
In re Russell Cave, 107 F. App’x at 451 (citing In re MicroPrecision Tech., Inc.,
303 B.R. 238, 243 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2003)).
36
Id. (citing In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 748–49; In re Georgetown
Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. at 137); 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12) (defining “claim” as a right to
payment and “debt” as liability on a claim).
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existent.”37 In other words, while a creditor can bring a claim for debt,
an equity holder cannot bring a claim.38 Accordingly, recharacterization
from debt to equity eliminates the claim in its entirety.39
Despite the Sixth Circuit’s ostensible advocacy of using only
§ 502(b), both in AutoStyle Plastics and Russell Cave, it stated in
AutoStyle that authority “stems from the authority vested in the
bankruptcy courts to use their equitable powers to test the validity of
debts. The source of the court’s general equitable powers is § 105 of the
Code . . . .”40 That statement seems to contradict the Sixth Circuit’s later
suggestion that analysis under § 502(b) is sufficient.41 If reclassifying
the debt claim under § 502(b) bars the claim from proceeding, then the
claim would never even reach analysis under § 105(a).42
For all of its discrepancies, the Sixth Circuit is not the only preLothian court to indicate that the inquiry stops at § 502(b).43 In 1999,
one bankruptcy court articulated:
[I]f a particular advance is a capital contribution, it never
becomes a claim. The debt-versus-equity inquiry is not an
exercise in recharacterizing a claim, but of characterizing the
advance’s true character. If the advance is not a claim to begin
with, then equitable subordination never comes into play.44

Classifying a claim as equity does not relieve a debtor from his
obligation to repay the claimant, but it does prevent the claim from
proceeding within the realm of bankruptcy.45 When a court classifies a
purported debt claim as an equity interest, the putative claimant no
longer has a claim. Instead, he holds an interest in equity.
37
In re Russell Cave, 107 F. App’x at 451; see also In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269
F.3d at 748–49.
38
See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 748–49.
39
Id. at 749; see also In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. at 126 (“[Claimant]
first claims that the notes should be characterized as equity instead of debt, such that they
are not claims in the case. [Claimant] claims alternatively that if the notes are
characterized as debt and hence constitute claims in the case, the obligations nevertheless
are subject to equitable or contractual subordination behind [claimant’s] claims.”).
40
In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 748.
41
In re Russell Cave Co., 107 F. App’x at 451 (citing In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc.,
269 F.3d at 748–49) (“A debtor’s request to recharacterize a claim is a request for the
bankruptcy court to hold a debt, and hence any claim, is non-existent.”).
42
In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2006).
43
See, e.g., In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. at 137; In re Russell Cave Co.,
107 F. App’x at 449.
44
In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. at 137.
45
Id. at 138 (“The classification of obligations as debt or equity is not a defense to
the obligation; it is simply a function of administering the relations between creditors and
equity interest holders.”).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Analysis of the Lothian Approach
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the phrase “applicable law” refers
to state law in Lothian.46 The court relied heavily on the idea that
“Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the
assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law.”47 Recognizing that the
reasoning in Butner pertained to property rights, the Fifth Circuit
understood the Butner reasoning to apply equally to bankruptcy
proceedings.48 In making that connection, the court cited part of the
Butner decision explaining that “there is no reason why such [state law]
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested
party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”49 Therefore, the court
assumed that the applicable law is, in fact, state law, excepting a
congressional statement to the contrary.50
The Fifth Circuit is no longer alone in its reliance on Butner.51
Following in the footsteps of its sister circuit, the Ninth Circuit reached
the same conclusion in 2013, when it issued its decision in Fitness
Holdings.52 In Fitness Holdings, the debtor corporation was financed
primarily by two sources, with whom it entered into numerous loan
agreements, which it later refinanced.53 Although the debtor continued
to make payments on its refinanced loans, its financial situation
continued to deteriorate, eventually resulting in bankruptcy.54 The
committee of unsecured creditors brought action to avoid the pre-petition
46

In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. Compare In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543 (holding that, under the
Butner principle, courts are required to define claims by reference to state law, and are
thus required to recharacterize purported “debt” as equity where state law would treat the
asserted interest as an equity interest), with In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448,
455 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a court has the equitable authority to recharacterize a
transaction and determine if it is more like “debt” or “equity”), and In re AutoStyle
Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 749–50 (announcing an eleven-factor test, derived from federal
tax law, for determining whether a purported “debt” is in fact “equity”). See generally In
re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting the presence
of a circuit split regarding which legal framework courts should apply in recharacterizing
claims).
51
See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d at 1146–47.
52
Id. at 1148.
53
Id. at 1143.
54
Id. at 1144.
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loan repayments, arguing that such transfers were not, in fact, loan
repayments but rather fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).55
The court found that the outcome rested on whether such transfers were
considered “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code.56 Applying Butner, the
Ninth Circuit advised that “a court must determine whether the asserted
interest in the debtor’s assets is a ‘right to payment’ recognized under
state law.”57 According to the Ninth Circuit, Butner meant that for
purposes of bankruptcy law, whether or not a transfer constituted a claim
turned on state property law.58
The court concluded that, in combination with the Butner decision,
§ 502(b) affords bankruptcy courts the power to recharacterize debt
claims of corporate non-insiders.59 Because applicable law means state
law, bankruptcy courts must disallow any claim that contravenes state
law.60 Before disallowing such a claim, however, the bankruptcy court
must determine why state law prohibits such claims.61 More specifically,
“where the reason for such disallowance is that state law classifies the
interest as equity rather than debt, then implementing state law as
envisioned in Butner requires different treatment than simply disallowing
the claim.”62 A bankruptcy court, in disallowing a claim, causes the
claim to be dismissed in its entirety.63 Total dismissal precludes a
claimant from asserting any other rights against the debtor.64 The
Lothian court bemoaned the severity of such a result.65 A bankruptcy
court cannot ignore the attendant rights of a claimant whose principal
claim it disallowed for contravening state law.66 The court opined,
55

Id. at 1147.
Id.
57
In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d at 1147.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1148 (“We agree with the approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Lothian
Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543, which is consistent with the Butner principle.”).
60
In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F. 3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011).
61
Id.
62
Id. The Lothian court also distinguished that “[o]ther circuits to have considered
this issue have approved recharacterization, but they have generally grounded it in the
bankruptcy courts’ equitable authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).” Id. (citing In re
SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); In re Dornier Aviation,
Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2006); In re Hedged–Invs. Assocs., 380 F.3d 1292, 1292
(10th Cir. 2004); In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2001)).
63
In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F. 3d at 543 (citing In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453
F.3d at 232).
64
Id.
65
See id.
66
In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543 (citing In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453
F.3d at 232).
56
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“[t]hese rights, fixed by state law, are not irrelevant to the court’s
decision to disallow a claim. To the contrary, recharacterizing the claim
as an equity interest is the logical outcome of the reason for disallowing
it as debt.”67
The Lothian court’s reliance on Butner introduces several
problems. First, Butner did not involve any recharacterization issues.
The case examined property interests outside the realm of bankruptcy.
Second, the Supreme Court issued the Butner decision before the
promulgation of the Code. In effect, the Lothian court relied on a nonbankruptcy case to evaluate issues that are grounded in a statute not then
in existence. Determining the proper Code provision is an undeniably
challenging task for any court. The Fifth Circuit should not use that as
an excuse to delegate that burden to the states.
The inapplicability of the facts in Butner to those in Lothian
presents an ancillary problem. Butner concerned a bankrupt landowner
who had defaulted on both of his mortgages and owed the petitioner
money.68 The petitioner requested that the bankrupt landowner repay the
petitioner using rent earned on the property.69 The bankruptcy court
denied the petitioner’s claim, holding that the petitioner had no security
interest on that rent, and that the rent profits should therefore be
distributed in the same manner as an unsecured claim.70 The case finally
reached the Supreme Court, which held that “Congress has generally left
the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to
state law.”71
That issue has little relevance to the issue at bar in Lothian. In
Butner, the Court evaluated an existing interest to determine whether it
was secured.72 The Court was not tasked with classifying a purported
67

Id.
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 48 (1979).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 54 (“The constitutional authority of Congress to establish ‘uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States’ would clearly encompass a
federal statute defining the mortgagee’s interest in the rents and profits earned by
property in a bankrupt estate.”) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4). Congress could
have chosen to pass legislation regarding the distribution of rent earned from a bankrupt’s
land; however, Congress did not exercise that authority. Therefore, state law controls the
issue. See id. at 54 n.9 (“In view of this grant of authority to the Congress it has been
settled from an early date that state laws to the extent that they conflict with the laws of
Congress, enacted under its constitutional authority, on the subject of bankruptcies are
suspended. While this is true, state laws are thus suspended only to the extent of actual
conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress.”).
72
Id. at 48.
68
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debt interest and therefore never even broached the issue of debt
recharacterization.73 In Lothian, on the other hand, the court had to
figure out whether the purported loan even constituted a property
interest.74 It seems overly academic to contemplate whether a property
interest is secured before knowing that a property interest even exists.
The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on one statement in the Butner
opinion: “Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless
some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why
such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”75 Taken out of
context, that statement could be read as applying broadly to all
bankruptcy cases. More likely than not, however, the Court simply
meant to say that with respect to property rights, one’s status as bankrupt
or non-bankrupt should not affect the outcome of the case.76 The Butner
decision addressed potential remedies for a mortgagor who lacks any
security interest on the rent profits of his mortgagee.77 The Lothian
decision, on the other hand, evaluated the potential extension of debt
recharacterization to non-insiders.78 The notion of insiders and noninsiders is salient in the Lothian decision,79 but does not appear even
once in Butner.80
Regardless of the possible inapplicability of Butner, the resolution
of the debt recharacterization issue in Lothian remains unsolved. Butner
instructed courts to apply state law in decisions regarding the property
rights of bankrupt debtors.81 The Fifth Circuit did follow the Butner rule
and applied Texas law to the facts of the case.82 At best, reliance on
Butner does nothing more than elucidate how a particular state would
resolve the issue. In Lothian, the court noted that “[t]o distinguish
between debt and equity, Texas courts have imported a multi-factor test

73

See generally id.
In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2011).
75
Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
76
See id. (“Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts
within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent
a party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy.’”) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Ntn’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
77
Id. at 48.
78
In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F. 3d at 543.
79
Id.
80
See Butner, 440 U.S. at 48.
81
Id. at 54. See supra note 71.
82
In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F. 3d at 544.
74
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from federal tax law.”83 The court justified its derivation of tax-law tests
by citing other bankruptcy cases that had proposed using some form of
the Roth Steel factors.84 By suggesting use of the 11-factor test
promulgated in Roth Steel and endorsed by the Sixth Circuit in AutoStyle
Plastics, the Lothian court does nothing to show that recharacterization is
based in § 502 rather than § 105.85
B. Implications of Adopting the Lothian Approach
If recharacterization, allowance, and equitable subordination all
lead to the same result, should anyone care which Code section the
courts use to justify their holdings? In short: yes. In Lothian, the Fifth
Circuit held that bankruptcy courts could end the recharacterization
inquiry at § 502(b) without ever considering the intricacies of § 105(a).86
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit disregarded the potentially dire
ramifications of its holding. In practice, application of the Lothian
approach would result in a slew of changes for bankruptcy courts,
debtors, creditors, and the general public. Some of those changes might
prove beneficial; however, adopting the approach would have a negative
net impact. Preserving the traditional approach, on the other hand, will
allow for more uniformity and predictability in the realm of debt
recharacterization.
Many scholars agree that “[b]ankruptcy is crucial to the functioning
of credit markets and the reallocation of capital. As such, consistency in
83

Id. (citing Arch Petroleum, Inc. v. Sharp, 958 S.W.2d 475, 477 n.3 (Tex. Ct. App.
1997)).
84
Id; see also, e.g., In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc., 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir.
2004); Jones v. United States, 659 F.2d 618, 622 n.12 (5th Cir. 1981). The “Roth Steel”
factors form the basis of a recharacterization analysis when a bankruptcy court is
exercising its § 105 equitable authority. Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987). The
“Roth Steel” factors were formulated in a tax court case and subsequently applied to
assessing recharacterization claims in the bankruptcy context. There are eleven
nondispositive factors: (1) the names given to the debt instruments; (2) the presence or
absence of a fixed maturity date and schedule of payments; (3) the presence or absence of
a fixed rate of interest and interest payments; (4) the source of repayments; (5) the
adequacy capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between the creditor and the
stockholder; (7) collateralized advances; (8) the corporation’s ability to obtain financing
from outside lending institutions; (9) the extent to which the advances were subordinated
to the claims of outside creditors; (10) the extent to which the advances were used to
acquire capital assets; and (11) the presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide
repayments. Id.
85
See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001) (advocating
use of the Roth Steel factors to determine the appropriateness of debt recharacterization)
(citing Roth Steel Tube Co., 800 F.2d at 625 (6th Cir. 1986)).
86
In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543.
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the application of bankruptcy law is of critical importance to the smooth
and unfettered conduct of business.”87 No one disputes the importance
of uniformity and predictability in the bankruptcy system; however, there
is disagreement as to which approach will result in the desired
uniformity.88 The traditional approach suggests that bankruptcy courts
derive their recharacterization authority from federal law, citing § 105(a)
as the source of that authority.89 Those holdings stand in sharp contrast
with the conflicting but nonetheless popular notion that
recharacterization authority must stem from state law.90
Proponents of the Lothian approach mistakenly believe that
deference to state law will generate a more predictable bankruptcy
system. In an avant-garde article, James Wilton and Stephen MoellerSally argue that state law “offers a higher degree of predictability
concerning the enforcement of insider debt and may serve as a means for
reconciling the conflicting and inconsistent tests applied by the federal
courts.”91 Interwoven in this argument are three separate, albeit related,
points from that assertion. First, Wilton and Moeller-Sally believe that
applying state law will result in greater predictability than that which
exists in the current system.92 Second, the authors maintain that the

87

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lothian Cassidy, L.L.C. v. Lothian Oil, Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1573 (2011) (No. 11-792), 2011 WL 6468137 at *18; see, e.g., James M. Wilton &
Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization under State Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257,
1279 (2007); David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection As Rent Seeking, 79 MINN. L. REV.
817, 836–37 (1995) (asserting that the major purpose of federal bankruptcy law is to
guarantee competitive conditions in a national credit market); Note, Switching Priorities:
Elevating the Status of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit of Optimal Deterrence, 116
HARV. L. REV. 2541, 2548 (2003) (concluding that the effects of the Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11 priority schemes have significant effects on the credit market).
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Compare Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 87, at 1257, 1278 (arguing that
uniform treatment of state-created property interests, by both state and federal courts
within a state, will achieve uniformity within the bankruptcy system, rather than
inconsistent federal case law), with In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th
Cir. 2006) (holding that § 105(a) of the Code authorizes bankruptcy courts to
recharacterize debt claims).
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See, e.g., In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 225; In re AutoStyle Plastics,
Inc., 269 F.3d at 745; In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1292.
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See In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543; Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note
87, at 1257; Niel M. Peretz, Recharacterization in the Ninth Circuit: Has the Supreme
Court Finally Derailed the Pacific Express?, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 4 (arguing
that the Ninth Circuit should recognize debt recharacterization because it has firm support
in applicable state law).
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current system entails federal courts applying inconsistent tests.93
Finally, the authors suggest that use of state law is a convenient way to
fix the problem of inconsistency.94
Wilton and Moeller-Sally have communicated what they perceive
to be the two greatest shortcomings of the current system: the variation
that exists in the number of factors considered and the weight ascribed to
each.95 Such differentiation, the authors bemoan, leads to inconsistent
results that provide no guidance to potential lenders.96 By considering
the facts on a case-by-case basis, the courts have rendered the multifactor test an ineffective guide for predicting the outcome of a case.97
Wilton and Moeller-Sally suggest that “[t]he difficulty that courts have
encountered in consistently applying the Roth Steel factors in bankruptcy
cases may arise, in part, from what some courts have opined is an
improper application of tax court precedents in the very different context
of priority disputes in bankruptcy.”98 The authors argue that some of
those factors are irrelevant or even injurious to a bankruptcy case.99
Given the purported discretion of the judges with regard to which factors
to apply and how heavily to weight them, extraneous factors should not
diminish the courts’ ability to apply the test.
The authors preemptively reject the possibility of applying the
multi-factor test in a more rigid fashion.100 An inflexible application of
the multi-factor test, the authors warn, would not account for the
complex nature of debt and equity instruments.101 They emphasize that
debt and equity lie on a continuum and are not separated by any fixed
line of demarcation. Determining the appropriate label, therefore,
necessitates the use of a flexible test allowing for the consideration of the
facts specific to the case.102 Although the authors make an important
point, it does nothing to strengthen their argument, because federal courts
do not apply the multi-factor test in such a rigid manner.

93
Id. (“To the extent that the Roth Steel factors render uncertain the enforceability of
debt instruments with conventional debt terms, state law is improperly preempted.”).
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Id. at 1279.
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Id. at 1263; see also Hilary A. Goehausen, Comment, You Said You Were Going
To Do What To My Loan? The Inequitable Doctrine of Recharacterization, 4 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 117 (2005).
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97
Id.
98
Id. at 1265.
99
Id. at 1266.
100
Id. at 1263.
101
Id.
102
Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 87, at 1263.

320

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:307

Despite their assertion that the multi-factor test results in
inconsistency and unpredictability, the authors propose an alternative
that would exacerbate those problems. Turning to state law imposes two
major issues concerning inconsistency.
Most significantly, by
propagating multitudinous recharacterization tests, such a system would
deter potential lenders by generating confusion as to which state’s law
will govern their contribution. The transactions surrounding a financial
contribution to a corporation are not confined to any particular state.
More likely than not, the transaction will implicate the laws of numerous
states. If the laws conflict with each other, how does one determine
which law to apply? Does applicable law mean the debtor’s state of
incorporation? What about the place in which the debtor conducts its
business? Perhaps the contributor’s state of domicile should determine
the applicable law. Then again, the state in which the contributor
executed the documentation might prove more relevant. What if a bank
facilitated the transaction? Should courts consider the bank’s charter
state?
To support their conclusion Wilton and Moeller-Sally point to the
Supreme Court case of Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue, which
involved a tax-evading corporation in bankruptcy.103 The case did not
address recharacterization.104 The Raleigh Court concluded courts
should apply state law to the substance of a claim, unless the Code would
suggest a different result.105 Where a federal interest contradicts the state
law, the federal interest must prevail.106 Unlike the law at issue in
Raleigh, debt recharacterization is implicitly addressed in the Code.107
Therefore, the holding in Raleigh provides neither binding nor
particularly persuasive precedent for the debt recharacterization issue.
Several circuits have agreed that the requirements of allowability
under § 502 are minimal.108 The low threshold imposed by § 502 results
103

Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 15 (2000).
See generally id. (construing a state law that shifted the burden of proof from the
government to the person responsible for the tax evasion).
105
Id. In Raleigh, the Illinois law at issue was not contravened by any provision in
the Code. By addressing issues of burden of proof arising from other situations, the
Code’s silence on this issue is particularly telling. As a result, the court found that the
state law should prevail. Id. at 26.
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Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006) (granting bankruptcy courts with the equitable
authority necessary to carry out the provisions of the Code, including the priority scheme
set forth in § 726).
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See, e.g., In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 225 (4th Cir. 2006); In re
AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Hedged-Invs.
Assocs., 380 F.3d 1292, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004).
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in an increasing number of claims being allowed by bankruptcy courts.109
If debt recharacterization requires nothing more than surviving § 502(b)
allowability, then the requirements for debt recharacterization will be
similarly minimal. Ending the inquiry at § 502(b) would mean that
bankruptcy courts would have to allow every claim for which an
exception did not apply, unless the applicable state law would not
characterize that claim as an equity interest.110 Adopting the Lothian
approach could lead to serious repercussions. Those repercussions will
most likely stem from the two most obvious aspects of the holding in
Lothian: the increased reliance on state law and the minimal
requirements imposed by § 502.
One foreseeable ramification of adopting the Lothian approach
involves the elevation of state law to a status that could render Code
provisions redundant. Except for a fairly significant caveat relating to
state law, the Lothian court found that § 502(b) gives bankruptcy courts
the authority to recharacterize debt claims as interests in equity.111 The
caveat to that rule comes from the Butner decision.112 According to
Lothian court, Butner instructs that bankruptcy courts can only
recharacterize debt claims if the applicable state law would also classify
them as equity interests.113 In practice, this means allowing those claims
that state law would allow and disallowing those claims that state law
would prohibit. That understanding of the Butner opinion propels state
law to such an elevation that it takes precedent over provisions in the
Code. The Code was enacted, in part, to generate uniformity in
bankruptcy law.114 By instructing bankruptcy courts to look for solutions
in state law rather than Code provisions, the Lothian approach
contravenes the fundamental purpose of the Code. Rather than solving
debt-versus-equity inquiry, the Lothian approach relegates that task to
the states.
The second troublesome aspect of the Lothian holding involves the
potential ramifications of grounding courts’ authority for
recharacterization in a Code provision whose requirements are so
109

See, e.g., In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 225; In re AutoStyle Plastics,
Inc., 269 F.3d at 748–49; In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1292; In re First NLC
Fin. Servs., LLC, 396 B.R. 562, 570–71 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Commonwealth
Biotechnologies, Inc., Bankruptcy No. 11-30381-KRH, 2012 WL 5385632, *6 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2012).
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negligible. This could play out in a number of ways. While its effects
would most likely prove injurious, favorable consequences could also
ensue. For instance, the imposition of a minimal threshold requirement
could lead to a reduction in the amount of time that courts spend on
recharacterization claims. By ending the recharacterization inquiry in
§ 502(b), bankruptcy courts could avoid the potentially time consuming
analysis in § 105(a).115 If every analysis under § 105(a) requires a
determination of whether the proposed recharacterization furthers the
purpose of the Code, one can imagine courts expending a lot of resources
here.116 Alleviating the time pressures faced by bankruptcy courts is an
admirable goal. However, if courts agree that implementing the priority
scheme of § 726 is an objective of the Code,117 the time spent analyzing
recharacterization under § 105(a) would be negligible. Furthermore,
§ 502(b) calls for the evaluation of recharacterization as part of the
allowability determination.
The time spent considering
recharacterization under § 105(a), while relegated to an earlier stage in
the process, does not cease to exist.
In practice, it seems much more likely that any positive
ramifications resulting from the circumvention of an analysis under
§ 105(a) would pale in comparison to the concomitant results of this
approach—namely, the profusion of recharacterization claims. If the
threshold requirements of § 502(b) are as minimal as most courts have
assumed,118 then recharacterization cannot serve as a factor that limits
allowability. That means that the number of claims allowed under
§ 502(b) will not significantly diminish as a result of adopting the
Lothian approach.
Because the Lothian approach compels
recharacterization for any claim allowed to proceed under § 502(b),
recharacterization would become more commonplace. That, in turn,
would have a negative effect on business, shareholders, and the public at
large.

115

See In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 231.
See id. Bankruptcy courts’ equitable authority under § 105(a) is limited to actions
that further the purpose of the Code. Accordingly, exercise of such authority requires a
consideration of the Code’s overall objectives.
117
Because the Lothian court did not analyze recharacterization under § 105(a), it
never explicitly acknowledged that furthering the priority scheme was an objective of the
Code. That omission does not impel the conclusion that the Fifth Circuit disagrees.
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See, e.g., In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); In re
Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 225; In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726,
748–49 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Hedged Invs. Assocs., 380 F.3d 1292, 1292 (10th Cir.
2004).
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In Lothian, the Fifth Circuit offered an inadequate explanation for
its dismissal of § 105(a), but merely explained, “[b]ased on the above
analysis, resort to § 105(a) is unnecessary.”119 In defending its decision
not to use § 105(a), The Fifth Circuit opined that:
[T]his court’s precedent reflects a cautious view of § 105(a). For
example, this court held that § 105 does not authorize bankruptcy
courts to punish criminal contempt committed outside the court’s
presence, in spite of the fact that other courts had approved using
that section to authorize bankruptcy courts to punish civil
contempt.120

This explanation does not particularly advance the Fifth Circuit’s
holding. Referencing unrelated situations in which the court took
caution in its use § 105(a) does not mean that the court can throw
§ 105(a) to the wayside in favor of § 502(b). Furthermore, the Fifth
Circuit’s cautious take on § 105(a) in criminal situations has little
bearing on the provision’s relevance to debt recharacterization.
Perhaps most importantly, ending the inquiry at § 502(b) would
negatively impact equity holders which, in turn, would prove deleterious
not only for them, but also for businesses and the bankruptcy system at
large.121 Undoubtedly, this approach would cause an unjust diminution
of rights for at least some equity holders.122 If courts decide whether or
not to allow a claim under § 502(b) based on the appropriateness of debt
recharacterization, then those whom the court classifies as holders of
equity will find themselves unable to bring any other rights they might
have vis-à-vis the debtor.123 In Dornier, the Fourth Circuit took
measures to avoid such an undesirable outcome.124 It insisted that if a
claimant does have other rights against the debtor, the bankruptcy court
must allow the claim to proceed under § 502(b), irrespective of whether
the court would classify that claim as debt or as equity.125 Accordingly,
even if the circuits were to agree that analysis under § 105(a) is
unnecessary, bankruptcy courts could only end the inquiry at § 502(b) in

119

In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011).
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See Matthew Nozemack, Making Sense Out of Bankruptcy Courts’
Recharacterization of Claims: Why Not Use § 510(c) Equitable Subordination?, 56
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situations in which the claim’s characterization is the only issue for the
claimant.
If nothing else, the Dornier opinion undoubtedly limits the
disallowance power of bankruptcy courts to claimants who have no other
rights vis-à-vis the debtor.126 Nonetheless, it seems unusual that the
determination of the origin of bankruptcy courts’ authority for debt
recharacterization should turn on whether a claimant has other rights
against the debtor. Under such a system, the recharacterization issue
ceases to play a central role in the inquiry. Moreover, if allowance under
§ 502(b) hinges on the claimant’s other rights against the debtor—and
not on whether the claimant is a holder of debt or of equity—then a
recharacterization analysis serves no useful purpose at this stage in the
process.
Under the equitable subordination doctrine, one’s status as a
corporate insider lowers the threshold requirement for the degree of
misconduct necessary for the court to subordinate the claim.127 In
AutoStyle Plastics, the Sixth Circuit considered the effects of insider
status as it relates to the equitable subordination doctrine.128 The Sixth
Circuit expressed concern with the ramifications of a reduced threshold
requirement for insiders.129 The court opined that the excessive severity
of equitable subordination is evidenced by the fact that it generates
enough fear to induce investors to stop investing.130
Because
recharacterization has the same financial consequences as equitable
subordination,131 the Sixth Circuit’s analysis and concern applies equally
to recharacterization. That is, the harsh effects of recharacterization have
a similar effect on corporate non-insiders as do the harsh effects of
equitable subordination on a company’s insiders.
In times of need, failing businesses often look first to their
shareholders.132 The shareholders, or insiders, have a vested interest in
the success of the business and are eager to see it succeed.133 Aware of
that reality, businesses understand that the current shareholders are the
most likely candidates to continue pouring money into the business.134
Much to the chagrin of the businesses, the threat of debt
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id.
In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 745 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 327 B.R. 389, 408 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).
See, e.g., In re Octagon Roofing, 157 B.R. 852, 858 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 745.
Id.
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recharacterization instills fear in their creditors.135 Creditors want
assurance the debtors will repay their loans, and if a bankruptcy court
recharacterizes the creditor’s loan as an equity contribution, the chances
of repayment all but disappear.136 In turn, creditors become less likely to
make loans to businesses in need.137 If creditors become less willing to
lend their support to flailing businesses, then those businesses are less
likely to stay afloat.138 For the business, this often means bankruptcy or
dissolution. For the employees, it means job loss. For the shareholders,
it means the loss of an investment. In other words, the business’s failure
benefits no one. Accordingly, courts should endeavor to avoid that
undesirable outcome.
In practice, many businesses rely on insider loans.139 From a policy
perspective, therefore, courts should encourage insider loans—not
discourage them by threatening to subordinate the claims of those whose
loan agreements result in litigation.140 Oftentimes, insiders are the only
ones willing to provide loans to a struggling business. As one court
articulately explained, “[a]ny other analysis would discourage loans from
insiders to companies facing financial difficulty and that would be
unfortunate because it is the shareholders who are most likely to have the
motivation to salvage a floundering company.”141 If, in fear of having
their claims subordinated, insiders cease making such loans, then
businesses that otherwise might have benefited from those loans will
struggle to survive.142 Accordingly, courts should be loath to make
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insider status the most significant factor in determining the permissibility
of equitable subordination.
Courts impose a higher standard on insiders because insiders,
owing to their relationship with the debtor, are more likely to engage in
inequitable conduct than non-insiders, who lack any sort of special
relationship with the debtor.143 The Fifth Circuit noted that insiders
typically had “greater opportunities for . . . inequitable conduct.”144 If
the importance of insider status stems only from its propensity to foster
inequitable conduct, and inequitable conduct is a factor in § 510, but not
in § 105 or § 502,145 then insider status does not seem applicable to an
analysis of § 105 or § 502. The court in Lothian recognized that
“[e]quitable subordination and recharacterization, although sometimes
based on the same facts, are directed at different conduct and have
different remedies.”146
Even within the confines of equitable
subordination, insider status is only one of many factors impacting a
court’s decision to equitably subordinate a claim.147 Indeed, “the mere
fact of an insider relationship is insufficient to warrant subordination.”148
The consequences of equitable subordination and debt
recharacterization differ in one significant way. “When reviewing
equitable subordination claims, courts impose a higher standard of
conduct upon insiders.”149 This stems from the reality that equitable
subordination requires a showing of inequity, and corporate insiders are
more likely than corporate non-insiders to conduct themselves in such a
manner.150 As a result, courts examine the conduct of insiders with a
greater degree of scrutiny.151 In determining debt recharacterization
under § 105(a), however, a bankruptcy court should not necessarily
consider one’s status as an insider. Debt recharacterization, unlike
equitable subordination, does not require a showing of misconduct.152
That brings into question the significance of insider status in a debt
recharacterization case.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If the Supreme Court addresses this issue, it should disregard the
Lothian approach.153 The Court recently denied Grossman’s petition for
certiorari, thereby forfeiting the chance to halt this divisive issue in its
incipiency.154
By introducing a new means of analyzing debt
recharacterization, the Fifth Circuit, perhaps unwittingly, has laid the
foundation for a polarizing circuit split. The choice of approach could
lead to a different outcome for recharacterization. Because the circuits
now disagree on the source of authority for debt recharacterization, it
seems likely that bankruptcy courts will reach different conclusions
when evaluating this issue. Some courts will stop the inquiry at § 502(b)
and others will continue to an analysis under § 105(a). Inevitably,
inconsistency will result. Such inconsistency will generate a slew of
negative consequences, including forum shopping. In recharacterization
cases, creditors and equity holders consistently want courts to
characterize their claims as debt. Accordingly, if the characterization of
a claim depends on which court hears the claim, then claimants will seek
out courts likely to characterize the claim as a debt instead of as equity.
Such forum shopping dilutes the purpose of the Code and leads to
excessive uncertainty regarding the outcome of a case.
The inconsistency problem becomes especially apparent in view of
the Lothian court’s promotion of the use of state law. Using a Supreme
Court decision that was issued before the creation of the Code, the
Lothian court found that the relevance of insider status hinged on its
relevance according to applicable state law. Two obvious issues flow
from the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Butner. First, the Supreme Court
decided Butner before the promulgation of the Code, thereby lessening
its value as a source of precedent. Second, Butner encourages reliance
on state law. Not only does such an approach generate inconsistency, but
it also offsets one of the main tenets of the Code—uniformity. Congress
did not codify bankruptcy law so that bankruptcy courts would make
their decisions based on the state law that applied in that case.
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the Supreme Court denied on February 21, 2012. The Court’s denial of Grossman’s
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Regardless of why the Court decides to address this issue, it should
rule in favor of those who oppose the Lothian approach.155 The
shortcomings of the Lothian approach render it an inappropriate stopping
point in the evaluation of the debt-versus-equity inquiry. Ironically, the
Lothian court acknowledged the fact that debt recharacterization required
a two-step inquiry.156 The court even criticized the district court for
failing to consider the second step.157 Despite that acknowledgement, the
Lothian court conflated two steps into one by suggesting that a
recharacterization inquiry should occur simultaneously with the
allowability determination under § 502(b).
Grounding courts’ recharacterization authority in § 502 will result
in an overabundance of recharacterization claims. According to
§ 502(b), a bankruptcy court must allow any claim to which no one has
filed an objection.158 If bankruptcy courts must allow every such
recharacterization claim, they will have no discretion with regard to
determining the appropriateness of recharacterization. By grounding the
authority in § 105, however, the Court will ensure that bankruptcy courts
make their decisions based on the equitable authority with which the
Code has granted them—not because they must.
Requiring bankruptcy courts to look beyond § 502(b) will promote
the financing of troubled businesses and distill fears of potential
contributors. To circumvent the problems that arise from the Lothian
approach, the Court can adopt either of two other approaches. The first
such approach entails an analysis under § 105(a) following any
determination of allowability under § 502(b). This approach mirrors that
used by the majority of circuit courts in the pre-Lothian era.159 More
than that, however, this approach aligns with the overall purpose of the
Code and follows naturally from a reading from § 105(a). As courts of
equity, bankruptcy courts have the authority to take actions that further
the purpose of the Code.160 It seems clear that such equitable authority
would include the power to promote the priority scheme established in
§ 726. If a bankruptcy court finds that debt recharacterization is
necessary to implement that priority scheme, then according to § 105(a),
the bankruptcy court should have the authority to do so.
155
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The second approach would require a § 105(a) analysis for only
those claimants who have other rights vis-à-vis the debtor. The Fourth
Circuit discussed this concept at length in Dornier.161 Ending the
analysis at § 502(b) is problematic because that section provides for the
total allowance or disallowance of a claim. Accordingly, if bankruptcy
courts refuse to consider equity as a claim, then the claimant cannot
proceed in any capacity. In other words, the characterization under
§ 502(b) ends the matter entirely. By requiring courts to continue the
evaluation for those claimants having further rights, the Court will dispel
at least some of the concerns about disallowance under § 502(b).
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See generally In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 232–36.

